While I’m not familiar with the exact theological axioms that pro-lifers employ to defend their anti-abortion stance, one of the most frequently-cited reasons that I hear in the political babble is anchored in the possibility of life. That is, the fetus, while not a viable entity capable of biological autonomy, nonetheless deserves consideration for what it may one day be: a moral agent with all of the legal protections offered to a person. While I don’t find this line of argumentation convincing in the least, it does introduce a litany of obligations to those who subscribe to it.
The potential for human life. If this is taken as a moral end worth pursuing, shouldn’t future generations—those who have yet to be conceived—demand moral consideration equivalent to that which we “should” give fetuses? There seems to be virtually the same amount of certitude-of-existence present within fetuses and those yet-to-be-conceived, after all.
Given such considerations, it seems like pro-lifers wishing to remain consistent and steadfast in their values, should be advocating sensible, sustainable environmental policies that will ensure the well-being of those yet to be born. Critics might reply that the more immediate cases—those actual fetuses that are in dire need of advocacy—should receive more focused efforts than their hypothetical counterparts. I would submit that this is a false dichotomy. Potential life is potential life—while one remains more tangible than the other, both have a guaranteed presence.
September 23rd, 2009
by JB
Interesting, I just had an exchange with a friend about the fact that the lack of a firm legal definition of “life” renders it impossible to categorize abortion. Vastly different criteria apply to those at the beginning of life and at the end. Are we talking heartbeat? Brain waves? Sentience? It’s not “murder” to disconnect somebody from a machine when they can’t survive without it but it is to disconnect them from the womb? Food for thought.